Nominee Directors and Performance Evidence From Indian State-Owned Enterprises

Archana Goel (Chitkara Business School, Chitkara University, Punjab, India), Kiran Mehta (Chitkara Business School, Chitkara University, Punjab, India), and Renuka Sharma (Chitkara Business School, Chitkara University, Punjab, India)
Copyright: © 2024 |Pages: 132
EISBN13: 9798369330821|DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9867-5.ch006
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Abstract

The effectiveness of board characteristics on the financial organization's performance has been examined in several studies. Studies that looked into the characteristics of the boards of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are scarce. Therefore, this chapter aims to scrutinize how nominee directors and Indian SOEs' perform. The findings consider that nominee directors raise the performance of the SOEs utilizing a variety of performance parameters and control variables. The research backs up agency theory. The conclusions have specific ramifications that the government and decision makers must address.
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