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Immortality has long been a human craving. Most religions have promised some form of an afterlife to satisfy this desire, but such hopes are not supported by evidence, and neither do they present a plausible path to achieve it.
On the other hand, science does offer a more realistic path. Immortality (in the sense of never dying) may ultimately be out of reach, but for the time being, a strand of scientists are working on the prospect of radically extending the lifespan (which is currently at an average of 72.6 years, and maxes out at 125 years).
Various hypothetical technologies have been proposed to this end. Stem cell therapies (Kurzweil & Grossman, 2009), rejuvenations procedures (Heylighen, 2014), regenerative medicine (De Magalhães, 2014), gene therapy (Grey, 2009), molecular repair (Bennett-Woods, 2006), and organ replacement (Fletcher, 2021) are some of the chief prospects that are currently discussed in this endeavor. These prospects are still only at a hypothetical level, and some analysts criticize their feasibility (Shermer, 2018).
But even if such prospects were feasible, bioethical objections are also frequently levelled. It is occasionally claimed that radical life extension is narcissistic (Peters, 2019), socially dangerous (due to its alleged potential to dramatically augment inequalities) (Green, 2015), and that it distracts from more pressing problems (Ward, 2022).
A common argument against the proliferation of life extension technologies appeals to demographic concerns. It is frequently posited that radical life extension technologies would alter the age structure of the population, and consequently, that would lead to a gerontocracy, where the elderly would form a voting bloc, and social welfare would collapse, given that the labor force would not be able to sustain the elderly beneficiaries (Post & Binstock, 2004). But this line of criticism is unfounded. There is no reason to assume that the elderly would form a voting bloc. As Daniel Binstock explains, “older people are as diverse in their voting decisions as any other age group; their votes divide along the same partisan, economic, social, gender, ethnic, and other lines as those of the electorate at large” (Binstock, 2004). Furthermore, even if the elderly do become a voting bloc, there is still no reason to assume that they will vote exclusively with self-interest in mind. Instead, they may prefer to vote in support of policies in which the younger generation (their own children and grandchildren) are given priority, very much as we currently have increasing awareness of our responsibilities towards future generations.
The main demographic objection to radical life extension is that, to the extent that with these technologies people die at a much older age (or may not die at all, if immortality ever becomes a reality), world population would grow excessively large, and consequently, that will bring about the expected problems of overpopulation.
Is this concern reasonable? Some enthusiasts of radical life extension argue that it is not a problem even worth considering. As reported by Peter Ward, “[renowned transhumanist Aubrey] De Grey has reached the point in presentations where he claims he no longer needs to answer such questions [about overpopulation], saying the immortalist movement shouldn’t waste time addressing them” (Ward 2022).
De Grey’s stance is not reasonable. Such questions are meaningful, and critics of radical life extension should be engaged. In what follows, we will attempt to refute the idea that concern with overpopulation is a good argument against radical life extension. We will make the case that life extension is unlikely to conduce to massive overpopulation, because the threat of an overpopulated planet comes chiefly from fertility rates, not longevity rates. However, we will also criticize arguments put forth by utilitarians who believe that overpopulation can never be a concern, because we have the moral obligation to keep expanding world population.